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RAPE SHIELD STATUTES: LEGISLATIVE
RESPONSES TO PROBATIVE DANGERS
ELIZABETH M. DAVIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, public concern for the dilemma facing rape victims
has increased. The rape victim' often is reluctant to report and pros-
ecute the crime because she feels as if she, rather than the accused, is
the defendant. At trial, the reason for the victim's feelings of appre-
hension is the admission of evidence of her sexual history. Tradition-
ally, this evidence has been admissible, despite its frequent
irrelevance to the issues at trial.
Attempting to lessen deterrents to reporting and to prosecuting
rape, forty-six state legislatures passed statutes that limit the intro-
duction of evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct.2 These rape
* B.A., Wesleyan University, 1981; J.D., Washington University, 1984.
1. Throughout this Note the term "rape victim" or "victim" will refer to the per-
son bringing charges. "Victim" actually will mean alleged victim, because the de-
fendant has not yet been convicted of the offense.
2. The following are the state rape shield statutes enacted to date: ALA. CODE
§ 12-21-203 (Supp. 1983); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 41-1810.1-.2 (Supp. 1983); CAL. EvID. CODE § 1103 (Deering Supp. 1984); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-3-407 (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 59-86f (1983); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 3509 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022 (West Supp. 1983); GA.
CODE ANN. § 38-202.1 (Supp. 1982); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 707-742 (Supp. 1983);
IDAHO CODE § 18-6105 (1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (Bums Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2, R.
20(5) (West 1983-84); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-447a (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 510.145 (Baldwin Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West Supp. 1983);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 21B
(Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520j (West Supp.
1983-84); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (West Supp. 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-
68 to 97-3-70 (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015 (Vernon Supp. 1983); MONT.
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shield statutes vary in scope and procedural detail,3 but all the stat-
utes end the presumptive admissibility of sexual history evidence.
The statutes restrict the circumstances in which and the extent to
which the defendant may present such evidence to the jury. States
pass rape shield statutes to balance the rights of the parties in a rape
trial. The prosecutrix has a right to privacy and a right to be free
from harassment at trial. The defendant has a right to introduce evi-
dence relevant to his defense and has a right to confront all witnesses.
This Note studies and criticizes the various standards of admissi-
bility of sexual history evidence contained in rape shield statutes. It
examines the traditional rules of evidence in rape trials,' and the ra-
tionales behind the statutory reforms.5 Following a general survey of
state rape shield statutes, 6 the Note's analysis of five statutes, 7 which
are representative of various degrees of admissibility, illustrates the
weaknesses inherent in the statutes. Finally, this Note proposes a
statutory scheme that better protects the interests of both the rape
victim and the defendant. 8
II. COMMON LAW EVIDENCE RULINGS IN RAPE CASES
Prior to the enactment of state rape shield statutes, trial courts reg-
CODE ANN. § 45-5-503(5) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-321 to 323 (Supp. 1983);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.090 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 322-A:6 (Supp. 1983); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-32.1 to 32.2 (West Supp. 1983-84); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-
16 (1983); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8-58.6 (Supp. 1983) (amended 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-15 (1983);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(D)-.02(F) (Page Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 750 (West Supp. 1983-84); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.475 (1983); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3104 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84); R.I. R. CRIM. PRO. 26.2; S.C. CODE § 16-
3-659.1 (Supp. 1983); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 23-44-16.2 (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-2445 (Supp. 1983); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.13 (Vernon Supp.
1983-84); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.79.150 (1983); W. Va. Code § 61-8B-12 (1977); Wis. STAT ANN. §§ 971.31, 972.11
(West Supp. 1983-84); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-312 (Supp. 1983). Arizona, Maine,
Vermont and Virginia have not enacted statutes.
3. This Note deals primarily with the differences in admissibility standards, rather
than procedural differences between statutes. See infra notes 86-129 and accompany-
ing text.
4. See infra notes 9-32 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 42-81 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 86-148 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
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ularly admitted evidence of the complainant's sexual history.9 Sev-
eral generally accepted beliefs concerning women purported to justify
this rule of admissibility. ' First, courts feared that vindictive women
would fabricate charges of rape and emphasized the difficulty of de-
fending against such charges."I Second, courts believed that chastity
was a character trait and allowed sexual history evidence to prove a
complainant's unchaste nature. ' 2 Third, courts judged premarital sex
to be immoral and admitted evidence of it to impeach the victim's
credibility.' 3
At common law, trial courts gave the defendant the opportunity to
prove that the complainant consented to the rape. At trial, the de-
fendant could attack the complainant's character' 4 for chastity' 5 on
cross-examination and when pleading consent as an affirmative de-
fense.' 6 The basic theory of admissibility is that unchastity is a char-
9. See Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment,
128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 546, 551 (1980) (discusses rationale behind common law
evidence rules in rape cases).
10. See Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 9, at 546. In addition to fears that venge-
ful women would falsely accuse men of rape, at least one scholar was concerned that
women's sexual fantasies would lead to false accusation. Dean Wigmore suggested
that psychiatrists examine complainants in rape cases to ensure that their accusations
are not based upon sexual fantasies rather than actual events. See 3A J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 924a (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1970); Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 9, at
547.
11. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 9, at 546.
12. See infra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
13. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 9, at 547. For a discussion of impeachment
by proof of an unchaste character, see infra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
14. "'Character' is a generalized description of one's disposition in respect to a
general trait such as honesty, temperance. .-. carefulness. Frase v. Henry, 444
F.2d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 1971).
15. "Chastity" refers to the abstention from unlawful sexual intercourse with a
male person. State v. Brionez, 188 Neb. 488, 490, 197 N.W.2d 639, 640 (1972).
16. See Rudstein, Rape Shield Laws: Some Constitutional Problems, 18 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 5 (1976). For recent cases stating this rule, see Williams v. State, 51
Ala. App. 1, 7, 282 So. 2d 349, 354 (1973) (general character of prosecutrix for chastity
may be impeached, but not particular instances of unchastity); State v. Jack, 285 So.
2d 204, 208 (La. 1973) (evidence of rape victim's general reputation for chastity is
admissible when consent is at issue, although specific acts of immorality cannot be
shown); People v. Whitfield, 58 Mich. App. 585, 592, 228 N.W.2d 475, 478 (1978)
(evidence of complainant's reputation for chastity and evidence as to specific acts with
defendant may be admissible to prove consent); State v. Yowell, 513 S.W.2d 397, 403
(Mo. 1974) (where consent is at issue in rape case, an attack on character of prosecu-
tnx for chastity can be made by evidence of general reputation).
1984]
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acter flaw that caused the complainant to consent to sexual relations
in the past, and so should be admitted to suggest her consent in the
present situation. 17
Courts were divided over what type of character evidence was ad-
missible to prove the complainant's unchaste nature. The types of
evidence generally introduced as proof of character were specific acts,
opinion, and reputation.'" The majority of courts allowed only the
introduction of reputation evidence 9 to show unchastity. This re-
striction existed because courts believed that evidence of specific sex-
ual acts and opinions could have a prejudicial effect that outweighed
its probative value.2" Additionally, collateral issues relating to the
specific acts might have distracted the jury from the main issues of
the case.2 ' Evidence of specific acts and opinion testimony also
might have resulted in unfair surprise to the complainant.22 A strong
minority of courts admitted only evidence of the victim's specific sex-
ual acts.23 Proponents of the view contended that juries were not dis-
17. See Rudstein, supra note 16, at 4-5. The court in People v. Collins, 25 Ill, 2d
605, 186 N.E.2d 30 (1962), stated the proposition that "The underlying thought here is
that it is more probable that an unchaste woman would consent. . . than a virtuous
woman. . . ." Id at 611, 186 N.E.2d at 33. Judge Cowen, in the often quoted People
v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192 (N.Y. 1838), asked, "And will you not more readily infer
assent in the practised Messalina, in loose attire, than in the reserved and virtuous
Lucretis?" Id. at 195-96.
18. R. CARLSON, E. IMWINKELRIED & E. KIONKA, MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY
OF EVIDENCE 341 (1983).
19. See Rudstein, supra note 16, at 5. Cases allowing only reputation evidence to
show consent include: Huffman v. State, 301 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. App. 1974) (repu-
tation is admissible, but not specific acts of intercourse between prosecutrix and third
parties); State v. Dipietrantonio, 152 Me. 41, 48, 122 A.2d 414, 421 (1956) (evidence of
general reputation of prosecutrix for unchastity may sometimes be admissible in rape
trial, but not evidence of specific acts).
The exclusion of specific acts evidence in the above cases is consistent with the
general exclusion of this evidence in any case in which a party wishes to use character
as circumstantial evidence of a person's conduct. Rudstein, supra note 16, at 5 n.24.
See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 186 (2d
ed. 1972) (discusses types of character evidence and their admissibility).
20. See Rudstein, supra note 16, at 5. The rationale for the majority view is the
likelihood that the slight probative value of specific instances of sex with third parties
is outweighed by the probability that collateral questions relating to the specific acts
would distract the jury, take too much time, and perhaps would unfairly surprise the
complainant. Id. at 5.
21. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
22. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
23. See B. CARDoZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 156-57 (1928); 1 J.
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
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tracted significantly by collateral issues. The minority asserted that
using reputation alone to gauge a witness' character was unreliable in
an expanding, mobile society.24
Occasionally, at common law, the victim's prior sexual conduct
was admissible even when the defense did not raise consent as an
issue. 2 ' For example, in statutory rape cases, where the unchastity of
the victim is a defense or a mitigating factor, specific sexual acts were
relevant and admissible.26 Also, the defense could introduce evi-
dence of the complaint's specific sexual acts with third parties to re-
but testimony concerning her physical condition following the
alleged rape.27 Traditionally, prior sexual conduct also was admissi-
ble to impeach the credibility of the prosecutrix.28 Courts reasoned
that promiscuity is a form of dishonesty; therefore promiscuity di-
minishes the complaint's credibility.29 A majority of jurisdictions re-
AT COMMON LAW § 200 (3d ed. 1940). See general), Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's
Tribulation., Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 2, 18 (1977).
24. See Berger. supra note 23. For cases accepting specific acts as proof of bad
character, see State v. Wulff, 194 Minn. 271, 274, 260 N.W. 515, 516 (1935) (in rape
prosecution, evidence of specific acts to show chastity is admissible); Burton v. State,
471 S.W.2d 817, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (when consent of prosecutrix is at issue,
specific acts of her unchastity are admissible).
25. See Rudstein, supra note 16, at 7.
26. Id See, e.g., Hickman v. State, 97 So. 2d 37, 39 (Fla. App. 1957) (specific acts
showing unchaste character are admissible in statutory rape case); State v. Weber, 272
Mo. 475, 483. 199 S.W. 147, 148 (1917) (in statutory rape case, specific acts between
prosecutrix and third parties are admissible on question of previous chaste character
of prosecutrix).
27. See, e.g., Harper v. State, 185 Ind. 322, 324, 114 N.E. 4, 5 (1916) (the birth of a
child), People v. Werner, 221 Mich. 123, 125, 190 N.W. 652, 653 (1922) (a ruptured
hymen)- Shapnard v. State, 437 P.2d 565, 591 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967) (pregnancy of
prosecutrix). cert. denied, 393 U.S. 826 (1968).
28. Brown v. State. 50 Ala. App. 471, 474, 280 So. 2d 177, 179 (1973) (someone of
bad moral character, such as an unchaste woman, is less likely to be truthful than a
person of good moral character); Frank v. State, 150 Neb. 745, 753, 35 N.W.2d 816,
822 (1949) (reputation for unchasteness and specific unchaste acts admissible to im-
peach credibility).
Prior sexual conduct used to impeach the victim's credibility also served as substan-
tive evidence, for example, to show consent, because it is relevant to facts material to
the prosecution. This general attack on credibility is distinguishable from more spe-
cific methods of impeachment, such as contradiction of a witness' story. See C. Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 19, § 47.
29. But cf. Tanford & Bocchmo, supra note 9, at 549. Tanford and Bocchino ar-
gue that the reasoning behind admitting sexual history to impeach credibility is
flawed. First, the inferences about promiscuity were limited to women; promiscuous
men could not be similarly impeached. Second, women that charged defendants with
1984]
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fused to admit for impeachment purposes evidence of the
complainant's promiscuity, limiting impeachment of the complainant
to evidence of her biases, defects in her sensory capacity, prior
inconsistent statements, prior convictions, and poor reputation for
truthfulness.3" A minority of jurisdictions admitted evidence of a
complainant's reputation for unchasteness to impeach her credibil-
ity.3 A small number of courts permitted the defendant to impeach
the prosecutrix using evidence of specific sexual acts.32
III. LEGISLATIVE PURPOSES FOR ENACTMENT OF RAPE SHIELD
STATUTES
In the early 1970's, state legislatures recognized the injustice in-
flicted upon rape victims by traditional evidence rules. In response,
the legislatures enacted rape shield statutes.33 These statutes attempt
to protect the rights of both the complainant and the accused,34 but
primarily the legislatures desired to shield the victim from humilia-
tion and psychological damage at trial.35 By restricting the admissi-
bility of a victim's sexual history, legislatures intended to make the
crimes other than rape could not be impeached by their prior sexual history. Id. at
549.
30. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 19, §§ 33-48.
31. E.g., Andrews v. State, 196 Ga. 84, 98, 26 S.E.2d 263, 278 (1943) (general
reputation of prosecutrix may be proved by accused), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 780
(1943); Frank v. State, 150 Neb. 745, 753, 35 N.W.2d 816, 822 (1949) (bad reputation
for chastity admissible to impeach credibility); State v. Cox, 280 N.C. 689, 695, 187
S.E.2d 1, 5 (1972) (general character of prosecutrix for unchastity may be shown to
attack credibility).
32. E.g., Frady v. State, 212 Ga. 84, 86, 90 S.E.2d 664, 665-66 (1955) (defendant
may show victim's prior unchaste acts for impeachment or to suggest consent); Frank
v. State, 150 Neb. 745, 753, 35 N.W.2d 816, 822 (1949) (specific acts of promiscuity are
admissible to impeach credibility); State v. Tuttle, 28 N.C. App. 198, 199, 220 S.E.2d
630, 631 (1975) (specific acts admissible to impeach credibility only on cross-examina-
tion of complainant).
33. The Michigan Legislature enacted the first rape shield statute in 1974. Act of
Aug. 12, 1974, 1974 Mich. Pub. Acts 266.
34. See generally Berger, supra note 23, at 39-84; Crawford, The Rape Shield Law.
Making It Work, 24 N.H.B.J. 109 (July 1983) (general discussions of legislative poli-
cies underlying statutes); Rudstein, supra note 16, at 9-14 (describes rape shield laws);
Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 9, at 566-90 (applying the standard to cases).
35. See, e.g., Hardy v. State, 159 Ga. App. 854, 860, 285 S.E.2d 547, 550 (1981)
(purpose of Georgia statute is "to eliminate the philosophy 'that women of promiscu-
ous sexual reputation are entitled to less protection than women of chaste reputa-
tion' "); Johnson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 277, 280, 246 S.E.2d 363, 365 (1978) (purpose
of Georgia rape shield statute generally is to protect complaining witness); State v.
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trial less traumatic for the victim. A correlative purpose of rape
shield legislation is to protect the victim's privacy.36 In addition, rape
shield statutes eliminate the prejudice jurors harbor toward a victim
that has a detailed sexual history. 37
States also must protect the constitutional rights of the defendant
in rape cases. A criminally accused is entitled to introduce evidence
relevant to his defense, especially evidence tending to prove his inno-
cence. 38 Many states enacted rape shield acts that attempt to balance
the victim's right to privacy against the defendant's right to present
an adequate defense.3 9
Cloatz, 305 N.C. 116, 120, 286 S.E.2d 793, 797 (1982) (North Carolina statute in-
tended to prevent unnecessary intrusion into privacy of victims of sex crimes).
Congress enacted a federal rape shield act, the Privacy Protection for Rape Victims
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-540, 92 Stat. 2046 (codified as FED. R. EvID. 412). Con-
gress intended the statute "to protect rape victims from the degrading and embarrass-
ing disclosure of intimate details about their private lives." 124 CONG. REC. 34,913
(1978) (remarks of Rep. Mann). For a history of state rape shield statutes with similar
stated purposes, see Note, Indiana's Rape Shield Law: Conflict With the Confrontation
Clause?, 9 IND. L. REV. 418, 435 (1976).
36. The privacy issue is a constitutional one, involving the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters. Cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt, v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), illustrate the constitutional limits on state intrusion into private sexual
activities.
37. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249, 252-53 (1966) (states
that in 60% of simple rape cases, juries acquitted where a judge would have con-
victed); Note, Limitations on the Right to Introduce Evidence Pertaining to the Prior
Sexual History of the Complaining Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape. Reflection of
Realit, or Denial of Due Process. 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 403, 407 (1975) (discusses frus-
tration of complainant and prosecutor when jury's acquittal is obviously attributable
to its low opinion of the victim's moral character).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, XIV. A defendant has the constitutional guarantee
of a fair trial with the opportunity to confront witnesses against him. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. In Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the United States Supreme
Court applied the sixth amendment right of confrontation to the states through the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause. These amendments give the defendant
the right to confront his accuser with questions and evidence that tend to prove his
innocence. The problem facing state law-makers is the extent to which this right
justifies an invasion of the rape victim's privacy by the introduction of sexual history
evidence.
39. See, e.g., Amburg & Rechtin, Rape Evidence Reform in Missourk A Remedy
for the Adverse Impact of Evidentiary Rules on Rape Victims, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 367,
383-84 (1978) (discusses Missouri statute's attempt to balance the victim's and ac-
cused's interests).
Two Supreme Court cases, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), and Da-
vis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), together stand for the proposition that a state,
through the mechanistic application of its evidentiary rules, cannot exclude trustwor-
1984]
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Public policy considerations also motivated the reform of common
law evidence rules in rape trials. Rape victims that are not forced to
reveal publicly their sexual histories are less hesitant to prosecute
their attackers.4" Rape shield statutes also promote judicial economy
by specifying the prerequisites for the admissibility of sexual history
evidence. By providing the courts with detailed guidelines, these stat-
utes eliminate appeals and retrials based on evidentiary issues.4"
IV. A SURVEY OF RAPE SHIELD STATUTES
All of the forty-six rape shield statutes enacted reject the tradi-
tional assumption that the victim's sexual history automatically is ad-
missible into evidence.42 Most statutes admit evidence of the
prosecutrix's prior sexual relations with the defendant, either auto-
matically43 or upon a showing of materiality. ' Beyond this provi-
sion, however, no uniformity exists among the state statutes. These
statutes can be analyzed according to four characteristics: 1) their
standards of admissibility;45 2) their uses for sexual history evi-
thy evidence critical to the accused's defense, without violating his right to due pro-
cess. Nor can a state deny or significantly curtail the defendant's cross-examination
of crucial witnesses without violating his right of confrontation, unless the defendant's
interest is outweighed by a legitimate competing state interest in excluding the evi-
dence or limiting the cross examination. See Rudstein, supra note 16, at 18. State
legislators must use a balancing test such as the one suggested by Chambers and Davis
in order to ensure the constitutional rights of both victim and accused.
The constitutionality of rape shield statutes is a complex issue, and beyond the
scope of this Note. For discussions of the constitutionality of rape shield statutes, see
Rudstein, supra note 16; Note, supra note 35; Note, The Illinois Rape Shield Statute:
Privacy at Any Cost?, 15 J. MAR. 157 (1982); Note, The Illinois Rape Shield Statute."
Will it Withstand Constitutional,4ttack, 1981 U. ILL. L.F. 211.
40. See Note, supra note 37, at 407. The Illinois Court of Appeals referred to the
Illinois rape shield statute as an "effective law enforcement tool . . . encouraging
victims of rapes and other sexual assaults to report these crimes to the proper authori-
ties without fear of having the intimate details of their past sexual activity brought
before the public." People v. Comes, 80 Ill. App. 3d 166, 175, 399 N.E.2d 1346, 1353
(5th Dist. 1980).
41. See Amburg & Rechtin, supra note 39, at 383.
42. See supra note 2 (listing of state statutes). See Tanford & Bocchino, supra
note 9; Note, supra note 37 (discussion of rationales behind statutory reforms of com-
mon law).
43. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 1103(b)(2) (Deering Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 750(A) (West Supp. 1983-84).
44. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 606.347 Sub. 3 (West Supp. 1983); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D) (Page Supp. 1983).
45. See infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
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dence;46 3) the types of character evidence they admit;47 and 4) their
exceptions to the general exclusion of sexual history evidence.48
State rape shield statutes vary in their standards of admitting sex-
ual history evidence. Some statutes prohibit almost any introduction
of a complaint's prior sexual conduct.49 For example, the Michigan
statute50 permits only the introduction of evidence of sexual relations
with the defendant and specific acts of intercourse with third parties
that may explain the victim's physical condition.5 This statute pro-
tects the interests of the victim at the expense of those of the accused,
by prohibiting the introduction of most evidence that may embarrass
the victim.
At the opposite end of the spectrum are those statutes that permit
the introduction of almost all sexual history evidence.5 2 For exam-
ple, statutes such as those of Texas5 3 and New Mexico5 4 admit any
sexual history evidence if its prejudicial nature does not outweigh its
probative value.5 New York's statute56 also is permissive in its ad-
46. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 110-29 and accompanying text.
50. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520 (West Supp. 1983-84).
51. Id See also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (Bums Supp. 1983); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2902.02(D)-.02(F) (Page Supp. 1983). This evidence is admissible
only if it is material to a fact at issue, and if its prejudicial nature does not outweigh
its probative value.
The federal rape shield statute, FED. R. EVID. 412, also is highly restrictive. This
statute prohibits absolutely reputation and opinion evidence. FED. R. EvID. 412(a).
The statute only admits specific instances of sexual conduct if they are with third
persons and are relevant to the physical conditions of the victim, id. 412(b)(2)(A), or
are with the defendant and are relevant to the issue of consent. Id. 412(b)(2)(B).
52. See infra notes 86-105 and accompanying text.
53. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.13 (Vernon Supp. 1983-84). See infra
notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
54. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-16 (1983).
55. See also ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1982) (admissible evidence must be
relevant and its probative value "not outweighed by the probability that its admission
will create undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or unwarranted invasion of the
privacy of the complaining witness"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407(e) (Supp. 1983)
(evidence must be "relevant to a material issue in the case"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.79.150 (1983) (evidence must be "relevant to the issue of the victim's consent;...
not inadmissible because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice;...
and ... its exclusion would result in denial of substantial justice to the defendant").
56. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84).
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mission of such evidence. The statute contains a general rule of ex-
clusion with specific exceptions, but has a catch-all provision that
allows the admission of evidence "determined by the court. . . to be
relevant and admissible in the interests of justice."57 These statutes
favor the defendant by their liberal admission of a victim's sexual
history, at the expense of her privacy.
Between these two extremes are statutes such as the New Jersey
statute58 that attempt to balance the interests of the victim with those
of the defendant. The New Jersey statute generally excludes sexual
history evidence, but allows for the admission of certain evidence if
its prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value. If the
sexual conduct occurred more than one year prior to the alleged rape,
however, it is inadmissible.59
Some statutes distinguish the admission of sexual history evidence
for substantive uses60 from its admission solely to impeach the com-
plainant's credibility.6 The California Evidence Code62 prohibits
the introduction of such evidence to prove consent, 63 but permits the
use of prior sexual conduct to attack the victim's credibility.64 Stat-
utes like those of Michigan65 and Texas6 6 arguably prohibit abso-
lutely the use of sexual history evidence to impeach the victim. These
statutes bar all evidence of the complainant's sexual conduct that is
57. Id See infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
58. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-32.1 to -32.2 (West Supp. 1983-84). See infra
notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
59. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.2 (West Supp. 1983-84).
60. Substantive uses for sexual history evidence include admitting it to prove con-
sent of source of semen, disease, or pregnancy. See N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 60.42
(McKinney Supp. 1983-84).
61. The credibility of a witness is always at issue from the moment he takes the
witness stand. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 19, §§ 33-48.
62. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103 (Deering Supp. 1984).
63. The California Evidence Code, however, provides two instances in which sex-
ual history evidence is admissible to show consent: proof of the complaining witness'
sexual conduct with the defendant, CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(b)(2) (Deering Supp.
1984), and rebuttal evidence respecting the complainant's sexual conduct. Id.
§ 1103(b)(3).
64. CAL. EvID. CODE § 782 (Deering Supp. 1984). The Code permits sexual con-
duct evidence to impeach credibility only if the trial judge first conducts a hearing as
to its admissibility. See also ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1982); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3509 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-15 (1983).
65. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West Supp. 1983-84).
66. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.13 (Vernon Supp. 1983-84).
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not "material to a fact at issue.",67 Because credibility is not techni-
cally a "fact at issue," the statutes could be construed to bar any sex-
ual history evidence offered to attack a complainant's credibility.
68
Some statutes distinguish types of admissible sexual history evi-
dence.69 The different types of sexual history evidence are reputa-
tion, opinion, and specific acts." Some statutes bar only certain
types of sexual history evidence, such as specific acts, but do not ex-
clude evidence of reputation.7' The majority of statutes, however,
include all types of this evidence within the general prohibition.72
Some statutes can be grouped according to the exceptions they
make to the general exclusion of sexual history evidence. As noted
above, most statutes admit evidence of a complainant's sexual rela-
tions with the defendant.73 Some statutes allow sexual history evi-
dence to rebut the state's showing of the victim's prior chastity.
74
Other statutes permit the introduction of sexual history evidence to
prove the source of semen, pregnancy, or disease.75 In an attempt to
exclude stale evidence,76 several jurisdictions impose limits on how
old sexual history evidence can be.77 Some states allow sexual his-
tory evidence if it shows that the prosecutrix is biased or has a motive
to fabricate rape charges.78 To prove consent, a few statutes allow
evidence of the victim's prior consensual relations with third parties,
67. Id. § 21.13(a). MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j(l) (West Supp. 1983-84).
68. Other statutes that absolutely prohibit the use of sexual history evidence for
impeachment purposes include: IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4(b) (Bums Supp. 1983);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(D)-.02(F) (Page Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.475 (1983).
69. See Burger, supra note 23, at 36-37.
70. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.13(a) (Vernon Supp. 1983-84); Berger,
supra note 23, at 36.
71. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022 (West Supp. 1983); S.D. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 23-44-16.2 (Supp. 1983).
72. See Berger, supra note 23, at 36.
73. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 750 (West Supp. 1983-84).
75. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j(l)(b) (West Supp. 1983-84);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (West Supp. 1984).
76 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.2 (West Supp. 1983-84). The time
limit imposed by rape shield statutes is usually one year.
77. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 R
20(5) (West 1983-84).
78. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (Supp. 1983).
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if they are substantially similar to the alleged conduct with the de-
fendant. 9 Some statutes admit evidence that proves that the defend-
ant reasonably believed the complainant consented. 0
The above survey of rape shield statutes demonstrates a wide vari-
ation in what sexual history evidence different jurisdictions consider
sufficiently probative to outweigh countervailing prejudicial dangers.
The legislatures' preference for protecting either the interests of the
victim or those of the defendant, or for creating a balance between
the two,8 ' determines how the statutes define relevant, admissible
evidence.
V. THE LEGAL RELEVANCE DOCTRINE AND RAPE SHIELD
STATUTES
Although sexual history evidence is logically relevant 82 to the is-
sues of consent and credibility, logical relevance alone does not en-
sure the admissibility of this evidence. The evidence also must be
79. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983) (when consent is at
issue, evidence is admissible if "it tends to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior"
by victim); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (West Supp. 1984) (when defense is consent
or fabrication of charges, evidence is allowed if it tends to establish a scheme or plan
of similar conduct by prosecutrix).
80. See GA. CODE ANN. § 38-202.1 (Supp. 1982).
81. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
82. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 184. Logical relevance, or probative worth,
is the basic prerequisite for the admissibility of evidence. Id § 184. To be relevant,
evidence must render a desired inference more probable than it would be without the
evidence. Id. § 185. Relevant evidence is prima facie admissible. Id. § 185.
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
FED. R. EVID. 401.
The Advisory Committee's note following the rule states that relevancy "is not an
inherent characteristic of any item of evidence but exists only as a relation between an
item of evidence and a matter properly provable in the case." FED. R. EvID. 401
advisory committee note.
At a rape trial, the judge first must inquire as to whether the complainant's past
sexual conduct is relevant to any material issue. Usually, this inquiry entails deciding
whether the proffered evidence is probative of the victim's propensity to have consen-
sual relations. The inquiry also entails deciding whether the evidence is relevant to
the prosecutrix's credibility, which becomes an issue when she takes the witness stand.
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 19, §§ 41-48. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
See Note, supra note 37, at 414.
Those who claim that sexual history evidence is not logically relevant to the issue of
consent argue that women are free to control their own bodies and to consent or not
consent to sexual relations as they please. Each decision to consent to sexual inter-
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legally relevant.83 The legal relevance doctrine states that the trial
judge retains the discretion to exclude logically relevant evidence if,
in his or her judgment, the probative dangers of the evidence-such
as undue prejudice-outweigh its probative value.84 Section A below
examines five rape shield statutes85 representative of the different
standards of admissibility and analyzes each jurisdiction's applica-
tion of the legal relevance doctrine. Section B discusses the problems
associated with these statutes.
A. Five Rape Shield Statutes and Judicial Interpretations
The Texas rape shield statute 6 contains a lenient two-part stan-
course is discrete and unaffected by the past behavior of the woman. Note, supra note
37, at 414.
Proponents of the idea that prior sexual conduct is logically relevant to show con-
sent point out that it is the societal norm today for women to be non-virgins. See M.
HUNT, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE 1970s 149 (1974). The theory is that a virgin is less
likely to consent to intercourse than a non-virgin. People that engage in a certain type
of behavior are more likely to engage in this behavior at any randomly selected mo-
ment than are people that have never before engaged in such conduct. Note, supra
note 37, at 415.
83. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 185. See also E. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDEN-
TIARY FOUNDATIONS 95 (1980).
84. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 19, § 185. See also E. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDEN-
TIARY FOUNDATIONS 95 (1980).
Four generally recognized probative dangers may convince a judge to exclude logi-
cally relevant evidence. The first is "prejudice," the evidence's tendency to tempt the
jury to decide the case on an improper, emotional basis. A second probative danger is
the tendency of the evidence to distract jurors from the main issues in the case. The
third danger is undue time consumption, and the fourth is unfair surprise to the op-
posing party. E. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 95-96 (1980).
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 lists the countervailing probative dangers as "unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,. . . undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403. The rule
does not list unfair surprise as a ground for exclusion of evidence. The Advisory
Committee's note explains that notice, discovery, and continuances are more appro-
priate remedies for surprise than exclusion. FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee
note.
See generally Larsen & Brown, Foreward and Commentary, Point, Counterpoint, 24
N.H.B.J. 77 (July 1983) (arguments for and against the legal relevance of prior sexual
history evidence in a rape trial).
85. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 115-17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West Supp. 1983-84); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-32.1 to
-32.3 (West Supp. 1983-84); N.Y.CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1983-
84); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.13 (Vernon Supp. 1983-84).
86. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.13 (Vernon Supp. 1983-84). The statute
reads, in relevant part:
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dard of admissibility.87 The statute allows evidence of specific acts,
opinion, and reputation, if the judge finds that the evidence is mate-
rial to a fact at issue and that its prejudicial nature does not outweigh
its probative value.88 Both the state and the defendant have the right
to impeach a witness' credibility by showing prior felony convictions,
including those involving promiscuous sexual conduct. Furthermore,
at counsel's request, the court must give the jury a limiting instruc-
tion regarding the purposes for which the jury may consider the
evidence.8 9
The Texas courts have addressed this statute only three times since
its enactment in 1975.90 In Wilson v. State,91 the Texas Criminal
Court of Appeals excluded evidence of a victim's prior sexual con-
duct and articulated the admissibility standard that the proffered evi-
dence must be "germane" to the issue of consent.92 This vague
standard provides little guidance in determining when prior sexual
§ 21.13 Evidence of Previous Sexual Conduct
(a) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct, opinion evi-
dence of the victim's sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim's sex-
ual conduct may be admitted under Sections 21.02 through 21.05 of this code
(rape, aggravated rape, sexual abuse, and aggravated sexual abuse) only if, and
only to the extent that, the judge finds that the evidence is material to a fact at
issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not out-
weigh its probative value ...
(d) This section does not limit the right of the state or the accused to impeach
credibility by showing prior felony convictions nor the right of the accused to
produce evidence ot promiscuous sexual conduct of a child 14 years old or older
as a defense to rape of a child, sexual abuse of a child, or indecency with a child.
If evidence of a previous felony conviction involving sexual conduct or evidence
of promiscuous sexual conduct is admitted, the court shall instruct the jury as to
the purpose of the evidence and as to its limited use.
87. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
88. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.13(a) (Vernon Supp. 1983-84). See supra
note 86.
89. TE . PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.13(d) (Vernon Supp. 1983-84). See supra
note 86.
90. SeeJohnson v. State, 633 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1982); Wilson v. State, 548 S.W.2d
51 (Tex. 1977); Young v. State, 547 S.W.2d 23 (Tex. 1977). The court in Johnson v,
State, 633 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1982), stated that absent the issue of consent, evidence of
unchastity is inadmissible. Id. at 891. Young v. State, 547 S.W.2d 23 (Tex. 1977),
also stands for the principle that evidence of a victim's sexual conduct is properly
excluded. Id at 25.
91. 548 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. 1977).
92. Id. at 52. In Wilson, the defendant wanted to introduce evidence that the
victim had had an abortion two or three years prior to the alleged rape, that she had




The New York rape shield statute9 4 also sets a lenient standard for
admitting sexual history evidence. The statute contains a general
prohibition of sexual history evidence, 95 but enumerates four circum-
stances when it is admissible.96 In addition, the statute has a catch-
all provision, which admits evidence that the judge determines to be
date of the rape. The trial court excluded the evidence, and the Texas Court of Crim-
inal Appeals affirmed, holding that it was not germane to the issue of consent. Id.
93. The New Mexico statute also precludes sexual conduct evidence unless it is
..material to the case" and "its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh
its probative value." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-16 (1983). The New Mexico courts
have articulated more meaningful guidelines than the Wilson "germane" test for in-
terpreting this language.
In State v. Herrera, 92 N.M. 7, 582 P.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1978), the Court of Appeals
of New Mexico stated that the New Mexico rape shield statute incorporates a three-
part standard of admissibility. First, the defendant must make a preliminary showing
of relevancy of the sexual history evidence. Second, the evidence must be "material
to the case." Third, even if the evidence is material, its inflammatory or prejudicial
nature cannot outweigh its probative value. Id. at 15-16, 582 P.2d at 393 (1978). This
three-part test presents clearer guidelines for determining admissibility than the Texas
court's amorphous "germane" test. See also State v. Romero, 94 N.M. 22, 25-26, 606
P.2d 1116, 1119-20 (Ct. App. 1980).
94. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84). The statute
states:
§ 60.42. Rules of evidence; admissibility of evidence of victim's sexual conduct
in sex offense cases. Evidence of a victim's sexual conduct shall not be admissi-
ble in a prosecution for an offense or an attempt to commit an offense defined in
article one hundred thirty of the penal law unless such evidence:
1. proves or tends to prove specific instances of the victim's prior sexual con-
duct with the accused; or
2. proves or tends to prove that the victim has been convicted of an offense
under section 230.00 of the penal law within three years prior to the sex offense
which is the subject of the prosecution; or
3. rebuts evidence introduced by the people of the victim's failure to engage in
sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or sexual contact during a given
period of time; or
4. rebuts evidence introduced by the people which proves or tends to prove that
the accused is the cause of pregnancy or disease of the victim or the source of
semen found in the victim; or
5. is determined by the court after an offer of proof by the accused outside the
hearing of the jury, or such hearing as the court may require, and a statement by
the court of its findings of fact essential to its determination, to be relevant and
admissible in the interests of justice.
Id.
95. Id § 60.42. See supra note 94.
96. 1d. §§ 60.42(l)-(4) (McKinney Supp. 1983-84). See supra note 94.
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"relevant and admissible in the interests of justice."97
In the leading case of People v. Conyers,9" a New York court held
that trial courts can decide the extent to which an attorney can cross-
examine a witness about her prior prostitution convictions to attack
the witness' credibility.99 The court based its interpretation on the
statute's catch-all provision.' 00 Without having raised consent as a
defense, the defendant in Conyers wanted to introduce evidence of
the complainant's prior conviction for prostitution.10 1 Because this
evidence was applicable only to the issue of credibility, the New York
Supreme Court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion
by excluding the evidence.' 0 2 The court concluded that the New
York statute instructs the courts, via the catch-all provision, to restrict
unfair and irrelevant cross-examination of victims of sexual
crimes. 1
0 3
The New Jersey statute"° gives the trial judge discretion to admit
97. Id. § 60.42(5) (McKinney Supp. 1983-84). See supra note 94.
98. 86 Misc. 2d 754, 382 N.Y.S.2d 437 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
99. Id at 761, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
100. Id
101. Id at 762, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
102. Id See also State v. Iaukea, 616 P.2d 219, 221 (Hawaii 1980) (interpreting
similarly lenient statutes); Commonwealth v. Edgerly, 13 Mass. App. 562, 568, 435
N.E.2d 641, 645 (1982).
103. 86 Misc. 2d at 764, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 445. See also People v. Souvenir, 83
Misc. 2d 1038, 373 N.Y.S.2d 824 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1975) (N.Y. statute only disallows
evidence of victim's sexual relations with third parties).
104. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-32.1 to -32.2 (West Supp. 1983-84). The statute
reads:
2A:84A-32.1 Prosecutions involving rape; evidence of complaining witness'
previous sexual conduct
In prosecutions for the crime of rape, assault with intent to commit rape, and
breaking and entering with intent to commit rape, evidence of the complaining
witness' previous sexual conduct shall not be admitted nor reference made to it in
the presence of the jury except as provided in this act. When the defendant seeks
to admit the evidence for any purpose, he may apply for an order of the court at
any time before or during the trial or preliminary hearing. After the application
is made, the court shall conduct a hearing in camera to determine the admissibil-
ity of the evidence. If the court finds that evidence offered by the defendant
regarding the sexual conduct of the complaint witness is relevant, and that the
probative value of the evidence offered is not outweighed by the probability that
its admission will create undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or unwarranted
invasion of the privacy of the complaining witness, the court shall make an order
stating what evidence may be introduced and the nature of the questions which




sexual history evidence only after an in camera hearing. Evidence of
the complainant's sexual conduct is presumed inadmissible if the
conduct occurred more than one year before the date of the charged
offense.' In the hearing, the trial judge must balance the probative
value of the profferred evidence against the possibility of undue prej-
udice, confusion of the issues, or unwarranted invasion of the privacy
of the complaining witness.106
Little case law exists interpreting the New Jersey statute. In State
v. Ryan,'"7 the Superior Court of New Jersey excluded evidence of
specific acts with third parties to prove consent or to impeach credi-
bility.'0 8 This exclusion of specific acts evidence and the statute's
one-year time limit'0 9 are the only explicit restrictions on admissibil-
ity. Thus, New Jersey trial judges have broad discretion to admit
sexual history evidence.
The Illinois Legislature enacted a more restrictive statute. 0 This
statute prohibits the introduction of reputation and specific acts evi-
dence, except if the evidence concerns victim's previous sexual con-
2A:84A-32.2 Conduct one year or more prior to date of offense; presumption of
inadmissibility
In the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, evidence of the
complaining witness' sexual conduct occurring more than I year before the date
of the offense charged is presumed to be inadmissible under this act. L. 1976, c.
71, § 2, eff. Aug. 26, 1976.
105. Id. § 2A:84A-32.3 (West Supp. 1983-84).
106. See supra note 104.
107. 157 N.J. Super. 121, 384 A.2d 570 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
108. Id. at 124, 384 A.2d at 573. See also State v. Holmes, 157 N.J. Super. 37, 38,
384 A.2d 528, 529 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (trial court properly refused de-
fense attorney's request to question victim as to her particular sexual acts).
109. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
110. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983). The statute
reads:
§ 115-17. Prior sexual activity or reputation as evidence.
a. In prosecutions for rape or deviate sexual assault, the prior sexual activity
or the reputation of the alleged victim is inadmissible except as evidence con-
cerning the past sexual conduct of the alleged victim with the accused.
b. No evidence admissible under this Section shall be introduced unless ruled
admissible by the trial judge after an offer of proof has been made at a hearing to
be held in camera in order to determine whether the defense has evidence to
impeach the witness in the event that prior sexual activity with the defendant is
denied. Unless the court finds that such evidence is available, counsel for the
defendant shall be ordered to refrain from inquiring into prior sexual activity
between the alleged victim and the defendant.
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duct with the defendant."' At the trial judge's discretion, sexual
history evidence is admissible to impeach the victim's credibility." 2
In determining admissibility for substantive purposes, such as show-
ing consent, however, the statute does not allow for judicial discre-
tion: only evidence of the complainant's prior sexual relations with
the accused is admissible. 13
Illinois courts have determined that the rape shield statute properly
admits relevant evidence and excludes that which is irrelevant and
prohibitively dangerous. 1 4 In People Y. Comes,"I5 the Illinois Court
of Appeals articulated the rationale behind the statute, stating that a
rape victim's past sexual conduct has no bearing on whether she con-
sented to sexual relations with the defendant.1 6 The court excluded
the defendant's profferred evidence of the victim's reputation for un-
chastity and immorality."' Citing legislative intent, the court ex-
plained that excluding evidence of reputation and specific acts
ensures that the defendant cannot harass the victim nor divert the
jury's attention to collateral issues, but does not deprive him of his
right to introduce relevant evidence." 8
111. Id § 115-7(a). See supra note 110.
112. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 115-7(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983). See supra note
110.
113. See supra note 110. The statute makes no distinction between reputation,
opinion, or specific acts evidence. The trial judge may not prefer one type of sexual
history evidence over another.
114. People v. Requena, 105 Ill. App. 3d 831, 435 N.E.2d 125 (1982) (rape shield
statute does not preclude cross-examination of victim or prevent defendant from at-
tacking credibility); People v. Mangiaracina, 98 I11. App. 3d 606, 424 N.E.2d 860
(1981) (statute permits introduction of sexual history between victim and defendant to
show consent); People v. Siefke, 97 II. App. 3d 14, 421 N.E.2d 1071 (1981) (Illinois
rape shield statute constitutionally excludes sexual history evidence); People v. Back-
man, 92 Il. App. 3d 419, 414 N.E.2d 1369 (1981) (Illinois statute that precludes de-
fendant from questioning victim about prior sexual activity with third parties is
constitutional); People v. Comes, 80 Ill. App. 3d 166, 399 N.E.2d 1346 (1980) (exclu-
sion of victim's reputation for unchastity is proper); People v. Dorff, 77 Ill. App. 3d
882, 396 N.E.2d 827 (1979) (sexual history to impeach credibility where consent is at
issue is precluded under statute).
115. 80 Ill. App. 3d 166, 399 N.E.2d 1346 (1980).
116. Id at 175, 399 N.E.2d at 1357.
117. Id
118. Id See generally Murphy, Rape Shield Statute Upheld by Illinois App ellate
Court, 69 ILL. B.J. 110 (Oct. 1980) (discussion of Comes).
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The Michigan statute" 9 contains one of the most stringent stan-
dards for admitting sexual history evidence. The act prohibits evi-
dence of specific acts, opinion, and reputation. Evidence of sexual
conduct with the accused, or specific sexual acts that show the source
of semen, pregnancy, or disease is admissible only to the extent that
its probative value outweighs its prejudicial nature. 20
Michigan courts interpret this rape shield statute as severely re-
stricting the admissibility of sexual history evidence. In People v.
Thompson,'2' the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a victim's sex-
ual behavior with third parties is not relevant either to the issue of
consent 122 or to the victim's credibility. 23 The test for admissibility
stated in People v. Khan'124 is that proof of prior sexual conduct with
third persons must pertain narrowly to acts evincing a pattern of vol-
untary encounters characterized by distinctive facts similar to the
current charges. A court must balance the interests of the defendant
and the state and determine whether the defendant has made a pre-
liminary showing of a logical nexus between the complainant's past
sexual conduct and the issue of consent in the present case. 125 Most
recently, in People v. Paquette,126 the court of appeals discussed the
relevancy of voluntary sexual acts with third parties to the consent
issue 127 and reaffirmed the Khan test for admissibility. 28 Thesejudi-
119. MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 750.520j (West Supp. 1983-84). The statute
reads in relevant part:
§ 520j. (1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct, opin-
ion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the vic-
tim's sexual conduct shall not be admitted under section 520b to 520g unless and
only to the extent that the judge finds that the following proposed evidence is
material to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial
nature does not outweigh its probative value.
(a) Evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the actor.
(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or
origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease.
120. Id. § 750.520j(l)(b). The Michigan statute, enacted in 1974, was the first
rape shield statute adopted, and the model for other restrictive statutes.
121. 76 Mich. App. 705, 257 N.W.2d 268 (1977).
122. Id at 711, 257 N.W.2d at 272.
123, Id at 713, 257 N.W.2d at 272.
124. 80 Mich. App. 605, 264 N.W.2d 360 (1978).
125. Id at 620, 264 N.W.2d at 368.
126. 114 Mich. App. 773, 319 N.W.2d 390 (1982).
127. Id. at 777, 319 N.W.2d at 392.
128. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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cial interpretations' 29 make the Michigan statute beneficial for rape
victims, because they articulate a highly restrictive standard of
admissibility.
B. Problems with Rape Shield Statutes
State legislatures enacted rape shield statutes to balance the rights
of the victim and the accused. 3° The statutes examined above fail to
achieve this desired balance. The statutory language and the judicial
interpretations use the legal relevance doctrine' 3 1 in a rape case to
protect the interests of one party at the expense of those of the other.
The Texas statute's 131 liberal admissibility standard renders it
overinclusive. The statute admits sexual history evidence if it is ma-
terial to a fact at issue, and probative without being overly prejudi-
cial.1 33 Thus, the statute confers too much discretionary power on
trial judges. The "germane" admissibility standard stated in Wil-
son'134 is an inadequate safeguard against potential abuses of this ju-
dicial discretion. The Texas statute presents the danger of admitting
prejudicial sexual history evidence at the expense of the victim's
privacy.
The scheme of the New York statute 35 partially achieves a bal-
ance between the interests of the complainant and those of the de-
fendant. The statute's exceptions to the general prohibition' 36 admit
129. Missouri and North Carolina have restrictive rape shield statutes similar to
the Michigan statute. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 495.015 (Vernon Supp. 1983), N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6 (Supp. 1983). The following cases interpret the Missouri statute:
State v. Gibson, 636 S.W.2d 956 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (allows sexual history only
where probative of consent); State v. Brown, 636 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. 1982) (en banc)
(victim's sexual history is presumptively irrelevant under statute); State v. Thurber,
625 S.W.2d 931 (Mo. App. 1981) (facially irrelevant sexual history is properly ex-
cluded). The following cases interpret the North Carolina statute: State v. Baron, 292
S.E.2d 741 (N.C. App. 1982) (prior actual sexual conduct of victim is inadmissible,
not prior accusations); State v. Clontz, 286 S.E.2d 793 (N.C. App. 1982) (N.C. statute
is intended to protect privacy of rape victim).
130. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN, tit. 5,
§ 21.13 (Vernon Supp. 1983-84).
132. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
135. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84). See supra notes
94-97 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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relevent evidence for the defense and are not unduly prejudicial to
the victim. The statute's catch-all provision,'3 7 however, presents a
potential problem. Although Conyers interpreted the provision as a
mandate to restrict unfair and irrelevant cross-examination of rape
victims, 1 38 no concrete standard exists for determining what evidence
is unfair and irrelevant. Therefore, the catch-all provision presents
the opportunity for abuse of judicial discretion and the admission of
unduly prejudicial evidence.
The New Jersey statute1 39 gives a trial judge discretion to admit
sexual history evidence if the probative value of the evidence out-
weighs the prejudicial dangers. This broad standard 40 again creates
the potential for abuse of discretion. The one-year time limit on sex-
ual history evidence also presents problems. The legislature intended
to exclude stale evidence and thus ensure the relevancy of all admit-
ted evidence. 4 ' This provision, however, could exclude potentially
relevant evidence, such as the victim's distinctive pattern of sexual
behavior, a motive for fabricating charges, or testimony impeaching
the victim's credibility. Although the statute attempts to protect both
the victim and the accused, it also contains problems that could im-
pair the interests of both parties.
In its effort to protect the victim from harassment, the Illinois stat-
ute' 4 2 denies the defendant his right to present all relevant non-preju-
dicial evidence. General reputation evidence is irrelevant to the
issues of consent and credibility, so its exclusion is proper. But the
statute's blanket exclusion of specific acts evidence, could prevent the
introduction of relevant, non-prejudicial evidence, such as the vic-
tim's pattern of sexual conduct, or the victim's bias or motive for fal-
sifying charges. The Comes 4 3 court erroneously applied the legal
relevance doctrine in interpreting the Illinois statute. The court held
that prohibiting evidence of both reputation and specific acts does not
137. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
139. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-32.1 to -32.2 (West Supp. 1983-84). See supra
notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
142. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983). See supra notes
110-13 and accompanying text.
143. 80 Ill. App. 3d 166, 399 N.E.2d 1346 (1980). See supra notes 115-18 and
accompanying text.
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deprive a defendant of the right to introduce relevant evidence. 144
This interpretation of the statute over-emphasized the prejudicial na-
ture of specific sexual acts evidence and did not consider its possible
relevance.
The Michigan statute' 45 is too inflexible and excludes evidence
that could be relevant to the defendant's case. The courts' strict inter-
pretations of the statute146 also favors the victim. In particular, the
Khan test, which requires that admissible sexual history evidence in-
volve distinctive facts similar to the present case, 147 is likely to result
in the exclusion of probative, relevant evidence. A trial court has no
discretion to weigh the evidence and admit potentially probative evi-
dence. The statute also does not admit sexual history evidence to
impeach credibility, a prohibition that again may unfairly prejudice
the defendant's case.1 48
VI. CONCLUSION
State legislatures have applied the legal relevance doctrine differ-
ently in drafting their respective rape shield statutes. The numerous
applications of the doctrine illustrate the difficulty of devising a com-
pletely equitable rule for admitting sexual history evidence. The stat-
utes that articulate a lenient standard of admissibility pose the risk of
admitting irrelevant or unduly prejudicial evidence, which may im-
pair the victim's interests.' 49 Statutes that contain a strict standard of
admissibility prohibit evidence that could be relevant, and in fact,
critical to the defendant's case.' 50 Statutes that attempt to protect the
interests of both victim and accused are admirable, but often include
provisions that are detrimental to one of the parties. 5 '
144. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
145. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West Supp. 1983-84). See supra notes
119-20 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.13 (Vernon Supp. 1983-84). See
supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); MIcH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 1983-84). See supra notes 110-29 and accompa-
nying text.
151. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-32.1 to -32.2 (West Supp. 1983-84);




A synthesis of elements from these statutes provides a more equita-
ble standard of admissibility. To avoid undue prejudice to the vic-
tim, a rape shield statute generally should prohibit evidence of
reputation, opinion, and specific instances of prior sexual conduct
with third parties. 152 To ensure that evidence relevant to the defense
is allowed, the statute should list exceptions under which a trial judge
may admit evidence if the judge finds the evidence relevant to a ma-
terial fact, and that its probative value is not outweighed by its preju-
dicial nature.' 3 Evidence that is legally relevant should be
admissible for both substantive and impeachment purposes. This ev-
idence is crucial to the defendant's right to present relevant evidence
and to rebut the state's evidence.
Some of the statutes discussed above contain exceptions to the pro-
hibition of use of sexual history evidence, which if combined into one
statute, would fully protect the defendant's interest. These exceptions
to the general prohibition of sexual history evidence are: 1) Victim's
sexual conduct with the accused;' 54 2) specific acts of sexual conduct
that tend to prove the source of disease, pregnancy, or semen (if such
acts occurred within a specific time period);"' 3) sexual conduct that
tends to prove a victim's bias or motive to fabricate rape charges;15 6
4) a pattern of sexual conduct so distinctive and so closely resembling
the defendant's version of the incident at bar as would tend to prove
the victim's consent, or that she behaved in such a manner that the
defendant believed she consented;' 57 and 5) credibility evidence that
may rebut the complainant's proof concerning her prior chastity or
that the defendant caused her physical condition. 58
152. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); MICH.
ComP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 1983-84); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.1 to 32.2
(West Supp. 1983-84); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84).
See supra notes 94-129 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 1983-84); N.Y.CRIM.
PRoc. LAw § 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84). See supra notes 94-96, 119-20 and
accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West 1983-84); N.Y. CRiM. PROc. LAW § 60.42 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1983-84). See supra notes 94, 110, 119 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 750.520j (West Supp. 1982-84); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84). See supra notes 94, 119 and
accompanying text.
156. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); N.Y.
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These proposed guidelines attempt to eliminate the problems criti-
cized in the above statutes. The general prohibition and explicit ex-
ceptions should accommodate adequately the interests of the state,
the defendant, and the victim.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5,
§ 21.13 (Vernon Supp. 1983-84). See supra notes 86, 94, 110 and accompanying text.
Berger, supra note 23, at 97-100, proposes a similar model rape shield statute. In
addition to the above exceptions, Berger would also allow sexual history evidence to
show: 1) Evidence of prior sexual conduct, known to the defendant at the time of act
charged, tending to prove that he believed the complainant was consenting to this act;
and 2) evidence of sexual conduct offered as the basis of expert psychological or psy-
chiatric opinion that the complainant fantasized or invented the act charged. Id. at
98-99.
Berger's proposed statute includes a second section entitled "Procedure for Deter-
mining Admissibility." Id. at 99. This section proposes that the defendant be re-
quired to make a written motion seeking permission to use such evidence, together
with an offer of proof of its relevance. A judge would rule on the motion in an out-of-
court hearing and the accused would be permitted to question witnesses, including the
prosecutor. Id.
Because this Note does not deal with procedural differences between state rape
shield statutes, the Note's proposed statute does not include a procedural section.
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